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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,1 a Florida
district court has gone further than any other federal court in proscribing
a church's right to exercise its religious beliefs. The district court found
that the city's interests in public health, child welfare, and animal welfare
were sufficient to override the protection provided under the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment.2 After the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amendment 3 protects a religion's practice of animal sacrifice.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that while an individual's right to believe is absolute, his right to act according to those beliefs
may be circumscribed by the government when there is a sufficiently
strong interest.' This case presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify the test for government action that restricts a religious practice, and
perhaps to establish a fundamental minimum of activity that a religion is
entitled to practice unfettered by government regulation.
IL

FACTUAL STATEMENT

The city of Hialeah, Florida ("the city") enacted certain ordinances restricting the practice of animal sacrifice as part of a religious ceremony.
Plaintiffs, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. ("the Church"),
and its spiritual leader, Ernesto Pichardo ("Pichardo"), sued under 42
U.S.C. § 19836 alleging that the laws violated plaintiff's constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion. 6
'1. 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1989), af/d, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 494 U.S. 889 (1992).
2. 723 F. Supp. at 1487.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See
ed. 1991).
5.
6.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
723 F. Supp at 1469.
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The Church practices the Lukumin religion, known commonly in
Southern Florida as Santeria. The religion, as practiced by African slaves,
came to the United States from Africa by way of Cuba. Approximately
50,000 to 60,000 people practice Santeria in South Florida. Despite the
large number of practitioners and the religion's dilution among people of
different races, the majority of the Cuban-American people in America
still view the religion as backward, primitive, and socially unacceptable.
The consequences of this social stigma are that the religion is practiced
underground, involves little group activity, has little uniform authority
for the practice of rituals and rites, and few members know or are aware
of each other.' Despite his position as an "Italero," the second highest
ranking level of priest in the religion, and his role as plaintiffs' foremost
authority on the history, structure, beliefs and practices of Santeria,
Pichardo was unable to provide the court with many details regarding the
current state of Santeria in South Florida. 8
The sacrifice of animals including chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks,
guinea fowl, goats, sheep, and turtles is fundamental to the practice of
Santeria. s The details of the killing process were significant in the court's
analysis of this case. The priest, trained through apprenticeship in the
methods of sacrifice, punctures, without severing completely, the neck of
the live animal with one or more strokes of a short bladed knife. If done
properly, this will sever the carotid arteries and kill the animal instantly. 10 However, the court adopted the conclusions of the defendant's
expert witness, Dr. Michael Fox of the United States Humane Society,
and found that this was not a reliable or painless method of killing an
animal." Further testimony revealed that prior to sacrifice, and often for
periods of days, the animals are kept in close confinement with animals
other than their own species, and that such a situation causes great stress
and anxiety, for the animals."8
7. Id. at 1469-70.
8. Id. at 1470. Specifically, Pichardo was unable to give the identity, or number, of
other church officials or practitioners, and was unable to provide any details regarding the
disposal of animal carcasses following sacrifice. Pichardo testified that the Church is without
a centralized authority or written code, or a distinctive tradition. Id. at 1470-71.

9. Id. at 1471.
10.
11.

Id. at 1472.
Id. at 1472-73. For a variety of reasons this method does not ensure that the animal's

death will be instantaneous. First, puncturing the neck does not ensure that both carotid
arteries will be severed simultaneously. Second, this method will not always prevent the

lining of the severed artery from constricting, delaying, albeit briefly, the death of the
animal. Finally, in chickens and goats, it is virtually impossible to sever all four carotid

arteries with one stroke of the knife. Id.
12. Id. at 1473. Such a combination of stress and fear in chickens creates an even more
fundamental problem in those rites that involve the consumption of animals after the sacrifice. Such a situation affects the chicken's immune system, leading to the increased growth
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As an example of a Santerian ritual, the court heard extended testimony about the initiation rite. This rite is repeated approximately 600
times per year in South Florida, and on each occasion involves the sacrifice of twenty-five to fifty-five animals over an eight day period. The
court took particular notice of the fact that the Church sometimes initiates children although it is not the normal practice, and that the Church
often allows children to watch the sacrifices." Although Santeria principles adopt the governing municipal laws as controlling in the disposition
of animal carcasses," Pichardo nevertheless conceded that many of the
animal carcasses found in public places are probably the result of religious practices utilizing animal sacrifice, including, but not limited to,
Santeria.'s
Perhaps the most important body of testimony concerned the effect
that witnessing such sacrifices has on children. Despite the testimony of
plaintiff's expert witnesses that there was little or no adverse affect on
children, the court, in its discretion, adopted the testimony of defendant's
expert that there is a correlation between the observation of violence by
children, especially when conducted by persons of perceived high status,
and the likelihood of the development of violent and aggressive
behavior.1e
In June 1987 the Church began organizing, and preparing to open, a
church building that would function as the religious and. cultural center
for practitioners of Santeria.' 7 Soon after, the Hialeah City Council enacted the ordinances towhich the Church objects.' 8 Specifically the City
Council adopted the language of the state anti-cruelty statute,' 9 prohibited the possession of animals intended for sacrifice or slaughter except
where properly zoned,20 authorized registered groups to investigate
animal cruelty complaints,2 and prohibited the slaughtering of any animals on premises not properly zoned for that purpose."
of bacteria such as salmonella. Salmonella cannot be detected visually, and is very harmful
to humans who eat the chickens. Id.
13. Id. at 1473-74.
14. Id. at 1471 n.14.
15. Id. at 1474.
16. Id. at 1475. Dr. Raul Huesman, defendant's expert, has done extensive research on
the development of aggressive and violent behavior in children and adults. Dr. Huesman
testified that witnessing the sacrifices would be likely to produce "psychological processes
that promote greater tolerance of aggressive and violent behavior and might even increase
the possibility of aggressive and violent behavior by the child himself." Id.
17. Id. at 1476.
18. Id.
19. HIALEAH, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-40 (June 9, 1987).
20. HIALEAH, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987).
21. HIALEAH, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-71 (Sept. 22, 1987).
22, HIALEAH. FLA.. ORDINANCE 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
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The Church further alleged that the city had discriminated against it
during the Church's attempt to get the necessary licensing and permits
for the new building. 3 However, the court found that the city's actions
were not discriminatory for three reasons: first, any delays caused by the
city's actions were minimal, second, the Church did eventually receive all
the necessary permits, and third, considering the circumstances, the city's
actions were. all reasonable and non-discriminatory.",
III.

DETAILS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The court first addressed some preliminary standing and preemption
issues, finding that plaintiffs had standing to sue"5 and that Florida's ritual slaughter statute of animals did not preempt the city's ordinances and
regulations."
Turning to the First Amendment challenge, the court began by discussing the philosophical history of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically the First Amendment. The court noted that, although
these rights are entitled to the fullest protection under the Constitution,
this blanket of protection is not without limits.27
The district court noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
articulated a two-tiered framework for determining whether the government has violated the Constitution by actions that allegedly violate a person's freedom of religion.' s At the first level there are two threshold re23.
24.

723 F. Supp. at 1477.
Id. at 1477-79.

25. Id. at 1479.
26. Id. at 1480. First, FLA. STAT. ch. 828 (1976 & Supp. 1993) did not preempt the ordinances because an ordinance is only preempted when it directly conflicts with the statute.
The court found .that the city's ordinance merely modified the statute without directly conflicting with it. 723 F. Supp. at 1480.
Second, FLA. STAT. §§ chs. 828.22-828.26 (1976 & Supp. 1993) create an exemption for the
ritual slaughter of livestock for food. However the district court found that the city's ordinance only prohibited the sacrifice of animals when the "primary purpose is not food consumption." 723 F. Supp. at 1480.
Third, the court found that ordinances regulating the zoning of sacrifice did not conflict
with the'state statute's exemptions protecting ritual slaughter. Id. at 1481.
Finally, the court found that the imposition of criminal penalties for zoning violations did
not conflict with the state statutes relating to animal control or cruelty, which only imposed
civil penalties. Id. at 1481-82.
27. 723 F. Supp. at 1482-83. The court noted for example that the freedom of speech
does not extend absolutely to obscenities or shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre. Id. at 1483
(citing Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
28. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1983). The Supreme
Court, has not clearly articulated a test for these issues. The Eleventh Circuit's framework is
a result of the court's analysis of the Supreme Courts opinions in this area. See infra notes
29-30. This case goes one step further than Grosz. In that decision the Eleventh Circuit

19931
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quirements. First, the government's action must regulate conduct rather
than belief, and it must have both a secular purpose and effect23 Then, if
these requirements are met, at the second level the court must balance
the competing interests of the government and the religious
organization. 0
In the first level analysis, the district court found that the laws in question "clearly met the first threshold test" in that they were obviously directed at conduct and not belief.31 The court also found that the laws met
the second threshold requirement because the laws did not violate the
secular purpose test.82 The city conceded that it passed the ordinances in
response to the plaintiffs' decision to open a church; however the court
determined that the ordinances prohibited the "killing of animals by anyone for any reason, except in slaughterhouses" 'and therefore was not
aimed specifically at the plaintiffs.3 Furthermore, the court found that
the use of the phrase "ritual or ceremony" did not equate with "religion
or religious" because the ordinances would also prohibit non-religious
groups, as well as groups not protected by the First Amendment, from
sacrificing animals.' The court concluded that the effect of the city's ordinances on religious conduct was "incidental" to the secular purpose and
effect.35 The court also noted that the First Amendment does not require
strict religious neutrality38
Following the framework in Grosz v. City of.Miami Beach, 7 the court
then took to the admittedly "difficult" task of balancing the competing
interests of the city and the Church.38 The court noted that it must balupheld a city zoning ordinance that prohibited the use of buildings for public religious ceremonies on property zoned for single family residences. The Groszs were orthodox Jews who
used a separate structure on their property to hold daily ceremonies. The court articulated
the framework used in this case and held that the city had not restricted the religion in
violation of the constitution. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741.
29. 723 F. Supp at 1483. Regarding the first threshold test, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that "[tihe government may never regulate religious beliefs; but, the Constitution does not
prohibit absolutely government regulation of religious conduct." Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940)). Regarding the second threshold test, the court wrote that a law "may not
have a sectarian purpose" nor may the "'essential effect'" of the government's action be to
negatively influence the pursuit of religious activity. Id. at 733-34 (citing Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 607).
30. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 734-38.
31. 723 F. Supp. at 1483.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1484.
34. Id. at 1483-84.
35. Id. at 1484.
36. Id. (citing Wallace v Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
37. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1933).
38. 723 F. Supp. at 1484.
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ance the burden placed on the religious interest by the government activity against the government's cost in altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue.,3
The court first identified the Church's interest: to practice an integral
part of its religious ceremonies and rituals, namely the sacrifice of animals. The court then recognized three government interests: to protect
the welfare and public safety of the community as a whole; to prevent any
adverse effects
on the mental health of children; and to prevent cruelty to
0
animals.'
A.

Disease Control

The court found that the government had a compelling interest in controlling disease." Plaintiffs' testimony revealed that there is little regulation among practitioners regarding either the acquisition or the disposal
of the animal§ used in sacrifice. Each poses its own unique health
hazards." Because the Church members usually eat the animals following
their sacrifice, these regulations fall within the government's interest in
ensuring the purity and quality of food sources.'8 Furthermore, plaintiffs
did not dispute that many of the animals found in public places were the
result of animal sacrifices performed by members of their, and other,
religions.4
B. Protection of Children
No party can dispute that the government has a compelling interest in
protecting the emotional and psychological development of children. The
court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the risk of emotional
injury to children is more important than any countervailing religious and
parental rights."' In its discretion, the court adopted the conclusions of
39. Id. (citing 721 F.2d at 734).
.40. Id. at 1485.
41. Id. The court analogized this situation to the government's prohibition of snake handling and marijuana use. Id.
42. The animals are usually kept in unsanitary conditions before acquisitions and the
carcasses are often disposed of in a manner that promotes breeding and infestation of vermin and disease. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. 723 F. Supp. at 1486. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a
statute forbidding minors from selling magazines despite plaintiff's argument that her religion required that minors help distribute) and Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.N.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)(upholding a statute
allowing judges to order blood transfusions in the case of minors despite objections of parents, members of Jehovah's witnesses).
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Dr. Huesman, finding that exposure to the ritual sacrifices posed a significant risk to the emotional well-being of children and increased the likelihood that the child would become inclined towards aggression and
4
violence. 6
C.

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

The support for the government's interest in the welfare of, and the
prevention of cruelty to, animals is not as obvious as the government's
interest in the welfare of children. However, the court relied on a federal
district court opinion and a Florida Supreme Court decision finding such
an interest.'" At trial the court heard evidence that both supported and
refuted the government's interest. However the court, in its discretion,
adopted the opinions of defendant's experts that in both the period
before the sacrifice and throughout the ritualistic killing the animals experienced stress and anxiety amounting to cruelty.'
Having found that the parties' interests were in direct conflict, the
court then determined whether there was a workable exception to the
city's ordinances that would allow the religion to continue practicing
animal sacrifice. "An ordinance will [nevertheless] withstand constitutional challenge if an exception for religious purpose will 'unduly interfere
with fulfillment of the governmental interest.' -,9 The Church asked the
court to hold that the Church is entitled to an exception to the city's
ordinances.50 However, the court found plaintiffs' promise to comply with
any disposal ordinances would not address the city's interests in the welfare of children and animals.9 1 Furthermore, the court concluded that any
exception in favor of practitioners of Santeria was simply unworkable
given the disorganization inherent to this religion, and the administrative
difficulty in enforcing the ordinances with the proposed exceptions."
In conclusion, the court noted that, after balancing the interests, the
government's interests fully justified the absolute prohibition of ritual
sacrifice without the requisite permits and zoning."
46. 723 F. Supp. at 1486. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
47. 723 F. Supp. at 1486 (citing Human Society of Rochester v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480
(W.D.N.Y. 1986) and C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1968)).
48. Id. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
49. 723 F. Supp. at 1486 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
50. Id..
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1487.
53. Id.
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ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

This case, like the case of Grosz upon which the court relies, attempts
to balance the First Amendment's prohibition from restriction of religious
expression against a municipality's exercise of its police powers. By granting certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court will now have an opportunity to resolve this tension. The decision in Grosz provided one framework for evaluating these situations, and this opinion demonstrates once
again the difficulties that arise when a city's police powers directly conflict with a church's exercise of religion.
By upholding the ordinances, the district court effectively prohibited
the practice of Santeria in the city of Hialeah. The issue for the Supreme
Court becomes whether a city ordinance can prohibit the practice of an
integral rite of a religion when the members are left with no legal alternative for practicing their religion.
The only well settled principle of law in this area is that, while the
freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act cannot be. 4 Beyond
that simple proposition, the topography of the law is uncertain regarding
when either the government or the religion must yield in favor of the
other.
The district court properly analyzed the competing interests in this
case and determined not only that each was fundamental and important,
but that they were in direct conflict. The court could not create a workable exception that would accomodate the needs and interests of both parties. Either the government would have to accept the ponsequences of
animal sacrifice, or the religion would have to forgo the practice. Consequently, the court resorted to the balancing test to determine which party
would be forced to yield.
The framework articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Grosz is an excellent attempt at synthesizing the decisions of the federal courts in this
area, and to the extent that the district court relied on the framework, it
5 However,
cannot be faulted.6
there is a credible argument that the district court improperly balanced the competing interests in this case, or at
least utilized the wrong standard. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Court will have an opportunity to affirm the Grosz test and to define
more clearly the line between religious freedom and government police
powers.
The great majority of the district court's opinion focuses on identifying
the government's interests and identifying support in the case law for
finding that those interests are compelling. However, the court gives little
attention to identifying the proper standard for balancing the interests
54.
55.

310 U.S. at 296.
See supra notes 28-29.
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once identified. The court identifies the test as whether an exception in
favor of the religion will "unduly interfere" with the 'government policy,
and states that this standard is a "looser" standard than the least restrictive means test so familiar to the courts. This is not a balancing test at
all, but merely a requirement that the government prove that 1) it has a
compelling interest and 2) that an exception is simply unworkable. The
district court has ignored the weight to be given to the religious practice.
If the proper analysis requires a balancing test, then the Supreme
Court may very well reverse. This case presents the courts with the most
fundamental challenge to a religious practice. Outlawing animal sacrifice
works a dramatic effect on the practice of Santeria. The district court had
no hesitation in finding that animal sacrifice is an integral part of the
religion, and the evidence implies that it may play more than a symbolic
role.5
While the city's interests are strong they are not absolute. The city has
a strong interest in public health, and the evidence demonstrates that a
strong causal connection exists between the disposal of animal carcasses
and the creation of unsanitary conditions that promote disease.57 The
city's interest in the welfare of children is also strong; however, the court
should have considered that no evidence showed any direct or immediate
harm to children. Rather, the court found that because children exposed
to animal sacrifice are perhaps more likely to develop violent tendencies,
the city had a compelling interest 8 Such an attenuated theory must diminish the weight accorded this interest in the balancing test. Finally, the
court identified the city's interest in the welfare of animals. While the
court's conclusions cannot be challenged, the issue left for the Supreme
Court is whether the city's interest in the welfare of animals is sufficient
to outweigh the religion's interest in animal sacrifice.
What remains for the Supreme Court to decide is, first, whether the
district court erred in ignoring the balancing prong of the Grosz framework and, second, if so, 'whether the city's interests outweigh the religion's interest. A proper balancing may yield a very different result.
V.

CONCLUSION

A Florida district court has again attempted to evaluate the balance
between the freedom to exercise clause of the First Amendment and the
government's interest in public health and welfare. The district court decided that the city's interest in public health, child welfare, and animal
56. 723 F. Supp. at 1474-75. However, the court noted that there has been no instance
documenting a disease originating from a disposed carcass. Id. at 1474.
57. Id. at 1475.
58. Id.
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welfare was sufficient to justify ordinances banning animal sacrifice for
religious purposes. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide
the issues in this case. The district court may have ignored or misapplied
the balancing element of the Supreme Court's analysis in these cases. If
so the Court may reverse on the facts. However, the district court may
have properly recognized that in certain circumstances a sufficient public
interest, which cannot be accommodated by exceptions in favor of a reli-.
gion's beliefs, will, as a matter of law, outweigh the religion's interest in
practicing its beliefs.
PAuL L. BADER

